Misunderstanding the Mamasapano “misencounter”

Forty-four policemen dead – that was the final tally by the end of that fateful Sunday. Hours prior, the Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) were in the middle of undertaking a large-scale operation to hunt down two of the most wanted terrorists in the world.

Originally planned as nothing more than carrying out an arrest of high-profile criminals, the operation resulted into a bloodbath and a significant blow in the ongoing peace process between the government and the insurgents in Mindanao.

The men sought for were Zulkifli Abdhir, better known by his alias Marwan, and Abdul Basit Usman, both infamous terrorists. Marwan, allegedly the leader of the Kumpulum Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), a large Southeast Asian terrorist group, was part of the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists list.

Usman, meanwhile, is known for being a bomb-making expert and is thought to have been involved in several bombings. Together, the two men have a total bounty of 6 million dollars on their heads.

Unready, unwilling, unable

According to a timeline of the incident compiled by Rappler, President Benigno Aquino III, and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Mar Roxas have already been briefed of the operation as early as April 2014, though details were yet to be finalized.

Attempts in carrying out the operation were made in November and December of last year, with both being aborted abruptly. The SAF would later push through with the operation on January 25. This tells us that the operation has been in planning for almost a year, and yet, from what we have witnessed, it was still ill-prepared.

The reports showed that there were instances where communication with the team could not be established, which resulted in lapses in judgment and the reinforcements being unable to provide support.

Granted that one of the two targets were successfully killed, if it could be called a success, the aftermath still shows that we still suffered great losses in the process. 44 men may not be a lot compared to the 392 deployed for the operation, but suffering even just one casualty for an arrest is already too much.

On the other hand, the violence could have been avoided had negotiations been made instead. Considering the fact that the targets were sitting in the middle of enemy territory, would it not have been easier to discuss with the Moro-Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) of a way to have the criminals handed over to the authorities?

After all, as it currently stands, peace talks are being conducted between the government and the Islamic forces, and an agreement such as that would have strengthened their relations. If we were to assume that they were true to their word of wanting to establish their autonomous state peacefully, they wouldn’t say no.

War as an option?

While some people sought for justice, others clamored for war. In a report by The Philippine Star, Former President and incumbent Manila Mayor Joseph Estrada stressed that an all-out war with the Muslim insurgents is the only solution to the problem, and that any peace negotiations would be unsuccessful.

This is not at all surprising, considering that during his regime, Estrada conducted several peace talks only to find hostilities persisted regardless of the fact.

Former President Fidel V. Ramos, on the other hand, still believes that the peace process is the better solution to the long-standing problem. As history teaches us, Ramos opted to make peace with the MILF and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) during his presidency.

So the question now is, “Should we go to war?”

History, it seems, would provide us a better answer. Our history of battling the Moro insurgency now spans more than four decades, with our present talks on the BBL being the closest to closure we have ever reached since it began.

In that period of time, thousands of lives, civilian and military, have been lost; buildings decimated, whole cities and towns razed to the ground, and countless Filipinos living in fear of an imminent threat. The government has spent billions on a war against its own constituents, and billions more on rehabilitating those who were caught in the middle of it.

Do we really want more of that?

Another perspective

Regardless, we must not forget that the men we consider our enemies, the rebels that killed our policemen, are not foreign threats, but are Filipinos as well. The casualties were not one-sided; in that incident, only our countrymen shed blood.

Though we may draw parallels with the War on Terrorism carried out by the United States against countries in the Middle East, we must remember that this battle is not one between two nations, but one within our own borders.

We cannot immediately blame the Islamic forces for firing back at the SAF troops that day. We first have to see the situation from both sides of the coin. They felt threatened by the presence of armed men on their domain, especially since a ceasefire between them and the government was established, the same way we feel threatened when they overstep theirs and attack us.

The incident should serve as a reminder that an agreement between the government and the MILF should be reached in order to reduce any more needless deaths, and that the capture of Usman may serve as a starting point in relations between the two warring parties.

It is only through his arrest, and establishment of peace, that we can really honor the dead.